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Abstract. The current surge in income and wealth inequality in most western
countries, along with the continuous immigration to those countries demand a
quantitative analysis of the effect immigration has on economic inequality. This paper
presents a quantitative analysis framework providing a way to calculate this effect. It
shows that in most cases, the effect of immigration on wealth and income inequality is
limited, mainly due to the relative small scale of immigration waves. For a large scale
flow of immigrants, such as the immigration to the US, the UK and Australia in the
past few decades, we estimate that 10% ÷ 15% of the wealth and income inequality
increase can be attributed to immigration. The results demonstrate that immigration
could possibly decrease inequality substantially, if the characteristics of the immigrants
resemble the characteristics of the destination middle class population in terms of
wealth or income. We empirically found that the simple linear relation ∆S = 0.18ρ
roughly describes the increase in the wealth share of the top 10% due to immigration
of a fraction ρ of the population.
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1. Introduction
The recent surge in wealth and income inequalities is one of the most disturbing social
and economic issues of our time. The rapid increase in inequality, illustrated for the
US in figure 1, has generated much effort to understand the origin and possible control
of this trend and a wide variety of factors have been proposed as effectors determining
the dynamics of inequality. These factors range across the changes in social structure
and culture [1, 2, 3], the democratization of education [4], the rise of the financial
To which extent does immigration affect inequality? 2
Year
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
To
p 
10
%
 w
ea
lth
 s
ha
re
 in
 th
e 
US
 [%
]
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
Im
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
US
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
[%
]
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Figure 1. US wealth inequality and immigrant population in the US 1940-2010. The
share of wealth owned by the richest 10% (blue) and the immigrants fraction of the
US population (red). The inequality data are taken from [8]. The immigration data
are based on the US census data and taken from [13].
sector [5], exploitation rents and the character of institutions [2, 6, 7], tax policy [2, 3, 8],
bequests [9, 10], and the dynamics of personal savings [11, 12].
Immigration is considered as one of the factors contributing to wealth and income
inequalities in developed countries. The immigration rates to many developed countries
have generally increased in the past few decades and immigrants constitute a growing
fraction of the population, as illustrated in figure 1. As a result, the outcomes of
immigration are becoming increasingly important to their economies and labor markets.
Borjas [14] has exposed a significant effect of immigration on the wages of native
workers in the US (see also [15, 16, 17, 18]), specifically on the wages of natives with no
high school diploma. Card’s analyses [19, 20] provide a similar methodology, partially
supporting these results by showing that immigrants are found to be perfect substitutes
for native workers with up to a high school equivalent level of education but imperfect
substitutes in the case of college equivalent or higher education level. Ottaviano and
Peri [21] have recently argued that immigration had a small effect on the wages of native
workers with no high school degree and also a small positive effect on average native
wages and a substantial negative effect on wages of previous immigrants in the long
run. Rienzo and Vargas-Silva [22] have found that income inequality among immigrants
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in the US and the UK is higher than among natives. The general conclusions of all of
these studies were that although immigration has an effect on wage inequality and on the
distribution of income, it only accounts for a small fraction of the increase in inequality.
It was recently reported by Dustmann et al [23] that immigration “depresses wages
below the 20th percentile of the wage distribution but leads to slight wage increases in
the upper part of the wage distribution”. Card [20] has also suggested that immigration
accounted for 5% of the wage inequality increase between 1980 and 2000 in the US.
HIbbs et al [24] have recently presented a much higher figure of 24%, while other
studies estimated contributions of about 10% to inequality due to immigration in recent
years [25].
Much less attention was given to the effect immigration has on wealth inequality.
Ben-Gad [26] provided a theoretical framework demonstrating that the role of
immigration in the redistribution of income from labor to capital is small, supporting
some of conclusions drawn by Borjas [15]. Hao [27] has argued that immigration plays a
little part in the increase of wealth inequality in the past few decades in the US. Hao’s
analysis is based on a similar methodology to the previous studies of Borjas and Card on
income inequality, discussing the part education and skill play in wealth accumulation
processes. This study suggests that “lower-skill recent immigrants actually help to
maintain the share of the low educated, thereby contributing to only a tiny percentage
of the rising inequality”.
Multiple studies [14, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30] describe a large variety of immigration
types, with different characteristics in terms of skill, education and wealth. Specifically,
Borjas [17], Card [19] and Rienzo and Vargas-Silva [22] have shown that the increased
immigration to developed countries in the past few decades is usually characterized
by a varied background in terms of skills, education and socio-economic level, and
is generally much poorer than the population in the destination country. The
effect immigration waves with different characteristics have on inequality is naturally
dependent on those characteristics. Nevertheless, a quantitative estimation of the change
in inequality originated directly from immigration can be theoretically derived, under
certain assumptions on the immigrants characteristics.
In this paper we present a simple framework for quantitatively assessing the direct
effect of immigration on inequality. We do so by calculating the effect of “injecting” a
smaller population into a larger population on inequality measures. We consider different
scenarios reflecting various immigration characteristics. Such a calculation can be used
to evaluate the future effect of possible immigration scenarios, and equally important, to
quantitatively assess what part of the current increase in wealth and income inequality
in many countries can be attributed to the net immigration into these countries. The
presented framework significantly differs from methodologies used in the described recent
studies. In our case, we do not aim to demonstrate a statistically significant effect
by measuring wages and wealth values. Instead, we calculate directly the change in
inequality based on a few general assumptions on the immigrants characteristics and
on the wealth and income distribution of the destination country. We then use our
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theoretical findings for comparison with empirical data of inequality and immigration in
order to validate the calculations and the method in general. This way we can provide
meaningful estimations of the effect in discussion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. section 2 introduces the analysis
framework and its underlying assumptions. In section 3, we present the theoretical
results for the different immigration scenarios and under various sets of assumptions. In
section 4 we then validate and compare the calculations to empirical data on immigration
and inequality in different countries. section 5 concludes the paper and discusses the
results and their implications.
2. Methodology
The starting point of our theoretical approach is two populations - X and Y , which
represent two countries, or any two entities characterized by distributions PX and PY ,
respectively. These distributions can be either wealth or income distributions. We will
analyse the direct effect on the inequality measures of Y , following the migration of
n = ρNY individuals from X to Y . NX and NY are the population sizes of X and Y ,
respectively. Let us denote by X˜ (with distribution PX˜) the migrating population and
by Y˜ the Y population following the migration, as illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2. Illustration of the analysis framework. Two populations are analysed -
X and Y . We denote by X˜ the migrating population from X, consisting of ρNY
individuals, where NY is the original size of the Y population. We denote by Y˜ the Y
population following the migration, which is the union of Y and X˜.
The probability distribution of Y˜ is
PY˜ (x) =
NY
NY + n
PY (x) +
n
NY + n
Px˜ (x) =
1
1 + ρ
[PY (x) + ρPx˜ (x)] , (1)
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and the cumulative distribution function is therefore
FY˜ (x) ≡
∫ x
0
PY˜ (x
′) dx′ =
1
1 + ρ
∫ x
0
PY (x
′) + ρPx˜ (x′) dx′. (2)
To quantify inequality we will use the share of wealth/income owned by a top
wealth/income quantile q, S (q) or specifically the top decile (q = 0.1). Cowell [31]
discusses a wide variety of measures, concluding that none is universally superior to the
others. Therefore, we shall restrict our discussion to S (q), which is one of the most
extensively used measures (see, for example, [3, 8, 12, 32]).
The share of wealth/income owned by the top quantile q is
SY˜ (q) =
(
1−
∫ 1−q
0
x (FY˜ ) dFY˜∫ 1
0
x (FY˜ ) dFY˜
)
=
∫ 1
1−q x (FY˜ ) dFY˜
µFY˜
, (3)
where x (FY˜ ) is the inverse function of FY˜ (x) and µFY˜ =
∫ 1
0
x (FY˜ ) dFY˜ is the average
wealth/income in the population Y˜ .
A closed form expression for SY˜ (q) in the general case cannot be derived. In order
to obtain closed form expressions for the inequality measures it is necessary to make
certain limiting assumptions on the distributions of X and Y . An analytic derivation
for the case in which X and Y follow a Pareto distribution is given in Appendix A.
However, for practical purposes, numerical simulations can be performed in order to
calculate S (q) and compare it to the corresponding share of wealth of the original
population of Y .
We will consider 3 different immigration scenarios reflecting different types and
profiles of immigration waves:
• Random immigration - The n migrating individuals are randomly chosen from X
• Rich immigration - The n richest individuals of X are migrating to Y
• Poor immigration - The n poorest individuals of X are migrating to Y
The poor and rich immigration scenarios, as defined above, are extreme scenarios.
Indeed, in practice, rich immigration waves are not characterized by the migration of the
whole rich elite. Therefore, the analysis will provide a bound for the effect of immigration
in this case. Poor immigration waves are also not characterized by the total migration
of lower castes. However, this is less important quantitatively, since in this scenario, the
contribution of the migrating population to the total wealth or income is very small.
Each of the populations X and Y is initially described by the following properties:
• Population size - N
• Inequality - S (0.1) - defined as the share of wealth or income owned by the top
10%
• Mean wealth/income - µ (the inequality measures depend on the distribution shape
and are invariant under multiplication by constant. Therefore, we will only consider
the ratio η between the mean wealth/income of population X to this of Y )
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• Distribution shape
We assume that both PX and PY follow a log-normal distribution, which is
considered a representative distribution of wealth and income [12, 33, 34, 35, 36]. For a
log-normal distribution the cumulative distribution function is F (x) = 1
2
+ 1
2
erf
(
lnx−µ√
2σ
)
and its inverse is x (F ) = eµ+
√
2σ·erf−1(2F−1). Therefore, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the parameter σ and S (q) through S (q) =
∫ 1
1−q e
√
2σ·erf−1(2F−1)dF∫ 1
0 e
√
2σ·erf−1(2F−1)dF
(see equation (3)). Using this relation we can obtain the value of σ for the distributions
of X and Y corresponding to the desired initial inequality of these populations.
For the poor immigration scenario, it is possible to derive a simpler expression
for ∆S = SY˜ (0.1) − SY (0.1). Indeed, the contribution of the poor immigrants to the
total wealth of the Y population is negligible so we assume that it remains unchanged.
Therefore, the share of wealth owned by the top 10% in Y˜ will slightly increase, as
more individuals ( n
10
= ρNY
10
) are now a part of the top decile, due to the change in the
population size. As a result, the value of ∆S will simply be the share of wealth of the
ρNY
10
richest individuals in Y that are not a part of the top decile of Y , which yields to:
∆S ≈
∫ 0.9
0.9− ρ
10
x (FY ) dFY
µY
(4)
This result implies that for any given distribution of Y , the effect of poor
immigration is essentially dependent on the value of ρ only. For small enough and
realistic values of ρ (namely < 0.1) the dependence of ∆S on ρ is approximately
linear with a slope depending on the initial distribution of Y . This is originated in
the approximate power law characterizing the tail of wealth and income distributions,
for which the integral in equation (4) is proportional to ρ1−χ, for a small χ, which
depends on the power law exponent. When the initial inequality of Y is very high, the
contribution of the ρNY
10
individuals added to the top decile is relatively low and vice
versa. Therefore, we would expect the linear dependence of ∆S on ρ to be steeper as
the initial inequality of Y decreases.
A first order expansion of equation (4) for the case of Pareto distribution with tail
index α has the explicit form (see Appendix B):
∆S ≈
(
1− 1
α
)
0.11−
1
α · ρ . (5)
We note that the Pareto distribution is a better representation of the higher levels
of wealth and income than the log-normal distribution and therefore applicable for the
scenario of poor immigration (the log-normal distribution is a better representation of
the distribution overall, while the Pareto distribution is only a better representation
of the high levels of income and wealth). Several studies have established that
the characteristic values for α in the case of wealth and income distributions are
1.5− 3 [34, 35, 36, 37, 38], which yield to slopes of 0.14-0.16 in equation (5).
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We will now proceed to make a comprehensive and systematic analysis using
numerical calculations of equation (3).
3. Results
In order to systematically analyse the immigration effect on inequality we will consider Y
as a rich population characterized by high inequality (SY (0.1) = 75%) and consider X to
be a poorer population for two cases: one in which X is characterized by high inequality
(similar to Y ) and another in which inequality is significantly lower (SX (0.1) = 60%).
For all the different cases and scenarios we will vary the scale of the immigration (ρ)
and the relative wealth of X with respect to Y , η = µX/µY .
In addition, since the initial distributions are randomly created and, in the random
immigration scenario, the migrating individuals are randomly selected, the calculation
results will be slightly different in each run for the same parameters. Therefore, 500
different realizations were considered for every case and we calculated the average change
in S (q), so that the results are statistically robust. The results of this analysis are
presented in figure 3, where we can observe that for the random and rich immigration
scenarios both negative and positive effects on inequality are possible. In both scenarios
the reduction of inequality is possible by significantly increasing the share of wealth
owned by the “middle class”, i.e. by the population which is close to the median wealth.
Such a reduction is achieved when two conditions are fulfilled:
• A significant amount of wealth enters the economy, either when the migrating
population scale is large enough, or when the wealth of X is comparable to that of
Y
• The migrating population is not rich enough to be a part of the rich elite of Y
The results for the poor immigration scenario confirm the derivation of ∆S for this
scenario in equation (4), demonstrating that ∆S is linearly dependent on the scale of
the immigration (ρ) and is essentially independent of the distribution of X. In order
to quantify the dependence of ∆S on ρ, we calculated it for different values of SY (0.1).
These results are presented in figure 4 and show that for every additional 1% of poor
immigrants, the share of wealth owned by the top 10% will increase by 0.15 ÷ 0.2
percentage points. For most relevant cases, the slope is approximately 0.18, so the
change in the share of wealth owned by the top 10% roughly follows ∆S = 0.18ρ (∆S
is measured in percentage points and ρ in percent). We note that these slopes are close
to the approximate dependence on ρ derived for ∆S given a Pareto distribution of Y
(see equation (5)).
The results enable a quantitative estimation of the effect of immigration on
inequality, showing that for most cases, the effect of the different scenarios is limited
within ±1 percentage points. A larger effect can be achieved for the rich immigration
scenario if the immigration scale is very large (close or larger than 5%) or if the average
wealth of X is close to the average wealth of Y . Illustrative scenarios for such cases can
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Figure 3. The change in the wealth share owned by the top 10% in population Y
following the migration from population X to population Y . The calculations were
done for the two cases - low inequality X (SX (0.1) = 0.6) (left) and high inequality X
(SX (0.1) = 0.75) (right) for the 3 immigration scenarios - random (top), rich (middle)
and poor (bottom). For each of these cases the dependence of ∆S is on η - the ratio
between the average wealth of X and Y and on ρ - the fraction of the migrating
population. ∆S is measured in percentage points.
be the hypothetical immigration of the richest 10% elite of Spain to France, which will
significantly reduce the wealth inequality in France, or the immigration of the richest 1%
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Figure 4. The dependence of ∆S on ρ. (Left) The change in inequality for the
poor immigration scenario as a function of the immigration scale (controlled by the
parameter ρ). The black circles refer to a comparison with empirical evidence for
several cases investigated in section 4; (Right) Based on the linear dependence of ∆S
on ρ in the poor immigration scenario, the slope of this relationship is presented for
different values of the initial SY (0.1).
elite of Denmark to Switzerland which will significantly increase the wealth inequality
in Switzerland. However, in practice, rich immigration waves tend to be very small in
scale, so that their effect on inequality is likely to be relatively small as well.
4. Comparison with empirical data
In order to support the above findings, we compared the results with empirical data. We
present below a few examples for which historical data are available. These examples,
illustrated in figure 4, demonstrate that the linear relation ∆S = 0.18ρ is generally
applicable as a first order approximation to estimate the effect of immigration on
inequality.
• The immigration to the US during 1986-2012 consisted of approximately 26 · 106
immigrants, originating mainly from Mexico (5.5 · 106), China, India and the
Philippines [39, 40], which are approximately 10% of the US population in 1986.
Saez and Zucman [8] report that over this time period, the share of wealth owned
by the top 10% in the US increased by approximately 14 percentage points to 77%.
Due to the varied origin countries of the immigrants and their varied socio-economic
background, this immigration can be treated as random. However, Guillermina et
al report in the New Immigration Survey [41] that the wealth owned by immigrants
upon their arrival to the US, specifically from Mexico, China, India and the
Philippines, is very low when compared to the average wealth in the US. As a result,
in terms of our analysis, it can be considered as a poor immigration scenario. Based
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on equation (3) and the results reported in figure 3, this immigration wave can
explain an increase of approximately 1.5 percentage points from the 14 percentage
points increase in inequality, or a relative part of 11% of the increase. In the case
of income inequality, Piketty and Saez [32] show that the top decile share of income
had increased during 1986-2012 by approximately 12 percentage points. Using the
same analysis it is possible to attribute 15% of this increase to immigration. This
is in agreement with various estimations conducted by economists using different
models and methodologies providing results ranging from 5% to 24% of the increase
in income inequality [25].
• In the UK, approximately 4 · 106 immigrants were added to the working age
population between 1990 to 2014 [42]. This immigration period corresponds roughly
to a random immigration wave of 7% of the population. Rienzo and Vargas-
Silva [22] show that these immigrants are originated from various countries and
backgrounds, but are considered to be mostly low skilled and poor. This is also
supported by the data reported in the Labor Force Survey [43]. Piketty [3] argues
that during this period, the share of wealth owned by the top 10% in the UK
increased by approximately 10 percentage points. Using equation (3), based on our
analysis framework and considering the poor immigration scenario, immigration
can be attributed to an increase of approximately 1.4 percentage points of the
total 10 percentage points increase, or simply 14% of the increase. This analysis is
consistent with the empirical findings in [22]. Restricting the analysis to a shorter
period of time, it was found that in the past few years, an average of approximately
2·105 net immigrants came to the UK every year (0.3% of the total UK population).
Applying the analysis framework and equation (3), this translates to an increase
of 0.06 percentage points in the top 10% share of income, which explains 12% of
the annual increase in income inequality in the past few years in the UK, which is
approximately 0.5 percentage points per year, as reported by Belfield et al [44].
• Australia is another country attracting a large number of immigrants. The
Australian Bureau of Statistics reports that during 1995-2005 Australia received
approximately 106 immigrants, about 5% of its population [45]. Stilwell [46] argues
that during the same time period, the share of wealth owned by the top 10%
increased from approximately 42.5% to 52%. Based on these data, and applying
the analysis framework for the poor immigration scenario, immigration can be
attributed to an increase of approximately 1.1 percentage points of the total 9.5
percentage points increase, or 12% of the increase. This result is consistent with
the effect found for the other large scale immigration waves analysed in the US and
the UK.
• The massive immigration of refugees and asylum seekers from Syria to Europe,
mainly during the second half of 2015 is largely composed of poor and middle class
Syrians. The UN [47] reported that of 4.6 · 106 registered refugees, approximately
8 · 105 are in Europe, as of November 2015. Applying the analysis framework
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for the poor immigration scenario, it is possible to estimate that for every 105
immigrants to Europe, the share of wealth and income owned by the top 10% will
increase by approximately 0.004 percentage points. Hence, this immigration wave
has contributed to a small increase of approximately 0.03 percentage points in the
share of wealth owned by the top 10% in Europe, so far.
5. Discussion
We presented a systematic quantitative analysis framework to estimate the direct effect
of immigration on inequality. The application of this framework for the analysis of
the large scale immigration to the US, the UK and Australia in the past few decades
provides an explanation for 10%÷ 15% of the increase in income and wealth inequality
measures. This estimation is consistent with most of the empirical studies done for
the US, as reported by Borjas [16] and Nowrasteh [25]. In the case of poor-profiled
immigrants, which represents a large fraction of the immigration waves in the world, we
estimate an increase of 0.15÷ 0.2 percentage points in the top 10% share of wealth and
income for every 1% of the population added by immigration, or roughly ∆S = 0.18ρ
(see section 4 and figure 4). This simple linear relationship was demonstrated as an
applicable first order approximation to the increase in wealth and income inequality
due to the immigration of a fraction ρ of the population.
The main conclusion of the analysis is that in most realistic cases, in which the
immigrating population is poor compared to destination population, the direct effect of
immigration on inequality is relatively small. This conclusion is consistent with specific
analyses done for the income inequality in the US [14, 19] and supports more recent
studies advocating for easier immigration policies and open borders in many areas in
the world [23, 48, 49].
The rich immigration scenario creates the most dramatic effect on inequality of
the scenarios considered, and provides a bound of approximately ±5 percentage points
change in the share of wealth owned by the top 10%, even in the case of a very
large scale immigration wave (10% of the destination country). We also note that
in some cases, large scale immigration of rich individuals from a poorer population to a
richer population can significantly decrease inequality. As a consequence, international
immigration programs intended to attract rich individuals and families, such as the
Canada Business Immigration Program and Immigrant Investor Venture Capital Pilot
Program or the US EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, may lead to a reduction in wealth
inequality [50, 51, 52]. However, in practice, their small scale compared to the overall
population, makes this effect essentially negligible.
Our results are based on simple statistical findings and do not consider interactions
between the immigrant population and the destination population. This is, of course,
a limitation of our study, but also makes our results general and independent from any
immigration dynamics. As such, our results can be considered as a null interaction
benchmark. A more detailed analysis can consider positive or negative deviations from
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this benchmark and identify contributions of immigrants to the destination population
wealth and income distributions. Furthermore, our analysis provides only an estimation
of the direct effect of immigration on economic inequality. In the long run, inequality
measures are governed mainly by different factors related to the destination country
economic situation and policies [2, 3, 7]. Such policies could enhance or reduce the
direct effect immigration has on inequality. We note, however, that wealth accumulation
processes are relatively slow [12, 33], supporting the robustness of our results and their
validity. An empirical evidence for that is the analysis of annual immigration data for
the UK, found to be consistent with the results for a 24-years period (see section 4).
In addition, for our analysis we used the top 10% share of wealth and income as
measures of inequality. Similar results are obtained for the Gini coefficient, as presented
in Appendix C. Other measures of inequality can be used, and might dramatically affect
the results. For example, using the ratio of the share of income or wealth owned by the
top 10% and the bottom 10%, would result in a very different estimation in the case of
the poor immigration scenario. As the source population gets poorer, the increase in
inequality due to immigration would be higher. Hence, in practice, care should be taken
when measuring inequality and applying the analysis results for different scenarios. The
framework presented here can be easily generalized to any inequality measure derived
from the income or wealth distributions. Therefore, it provides a simple but powerful
analysis tool to estimate the initial effect of immigration on inequality under various
scenarios and assumptions.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the quintile wealth share for Pareto distribution
Let us first assume that X and Y follow a Pareto distribution, which describes well
higher levels of income and wealth, but not lower levels:
PX (x) =
 0 x < xmαxαm
xα+1
x ≥ xm
, (A.1)
while PY (x) follows a similar distribution with different values of xm and α. We will
assume xm is identical, and only assume two different α values α1 and α2 corresponding
to the distributions of X and Y , respectively. In addition, we assume the initial sizes of
X and Y may be different - NX and NY respectively.
We will derive an analytic closed form expression for the rich immigration scenario.
A similar derivation can be applied for the poor immigration scenario. In the case in
which X and Y follow the exact same distribution, random immigration is, naturally,
meaningless in terms of wealth or income inequality.
For rich immigration, we can define  as the lowest wealth value within the n
migrating individuals.  is a function of the distribution parameters xm and α1 and also
depends on NX and n = ρNY . As a result, the new population Y˜ , of size NY +n, follows
a slightly different distribution:
PY˜ (x) =

0 x < xm
α2x
α2
m
xα2+1
NY
NY + n
xm ≤ x < 
α2x
α2
m
xα2+1
NY
NY + n
+
α1
α1
xα1+1
n
NY + n
x ≥ 
. (A.2)
In order to calculate the inequality measures of Y˜ , the cumulative distribution
function and its inverse function should be derived. Following equation (A.2) we obtain
by integration and some algebra:
FY˜ (x) =

0 x < xm(
1− x
α2
m
xα2
)
NY
NY + n
xm ≤ x < 
1− 1
NY + n
(
nα1
xα1
+
NY x
α2
m
xα2
)
x ≥ 
. (A.3)
From equation (A.3) it is now possible to derive the inverse function of the
cumulative distribution function. For the general case of α1 6= α2 one cannot obtain a
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closed form expression for x (FY˜ ). Assuming α1 = α2 = α we obtain:
FY˜ (x) =

0 x < xm(
1− x
α
m
xα
)
NY
NY + n
xm ≤ x < 
1− 1
NY + n
(
nα +NY x
α
m
xα
)
x ≥ 
, (A.4)
and therefore
x (FY˜ ) =

xm(
1− FY˜ N˜
) 1
α
0 ≤ FY˜ < F
x˜
1
1− FY˜
1
α
F ≤ FY˜ < 1
, (A.5)
while N˜ = NY +n
NY
= 1 + ρ, x˜ =
[
nα+NY x
α
m
(NY +n)
] 1
α
=
[
ρα+xαm
(1+ρ)
] 1
α
and F =
(
1− xαm
α
)
1
N˜
.
The share of wealth owned by the top quantile q can be simply calculated by
taking S (q) =
(
1−
∫ 1−q
0 x(FY˜ )dF∫ 1
0 x(FY˜ )dF
)
. We will calculate several useful sub-integrals of the
integrals used for the calculation of S (q).
∫ F
0
x (F ) dF =
∫ F
0
xm(
1− FN˜
) 1
α
dF =
=
αxm
N˜ (α− 1)
[
1−
(
1− FN˜
)1− 1
α
]
=
=
αxm
N˜ (α− 1)
[
1−
(
xαm
α
)1− 1
α
]
(A.6)
If F > 1− q we get:
∫ 1−q
0
x (F ) dF =
∫ 1−q
0
xm(
1− FN˜
) 1
α
dF =
=
αxm
N˜ (α− 1)
[
1−
(
1− N˜ + N˜q
)1− 1
α
]
(A.7)
In addition we should calculate the following integrals:∫ 1
F
x (F ) dF =
∫ 1
F
x˜
1
1− FY˜
1
α
dF =
x˜α
α− 1 (1− F)
1− 1
α , (A.8)
and (given that F < 1− q)∫ 1−q
F
x (F ) dF =
∫ 1−q
F
x˜
1
1− FY˜
1
α
dF =
x˜α
α− 1
[
(1− F)1−
1
α − q1− 1α
]
.(A.9)
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There are two cases - if F > 1− q we obtain:
S (q) = 1−
∫ 1−q
0
x (F ) dF∫ F
0
x (F ) dF +
∫ 1
F
x (F ) dF
=
= 1−
xm
N˜
[
1−
(
1− N˜ + N˜q
)1− 1
α
]
xm
N˜
[
1− (xαm
α
)1− 1
α
]
+ x˜ (1− F)1−
1
α
, (A.10)
and if F < 1− q we obtain:
S (q) = 1−
∫ F
0
x (F ) dF +
∫ 1−q
F
x (F ) dF∫ F
0
x (F ) dF +
∫ 1
F
x (F ) dF
=
= 1−
xm
N˜
[
1−
(
xαm
α
)1− 1
α
]
+ x˜
[
(1− F)1−
1
α − q1− 1α
]
xm
N˜
[
1− (xαm
α
)1− 1
α
]
+ x˜ (1− F)1−
1
α
=
=
x˜q1−
1
α
xm
N˜
[
1− (xαm
α
)1− 1
α
]
+ x˜ (1− F)1−
1
α
. (A.11)
For a standard Pareto distribution S (q) = q1−
1
α and in the trivial case in which
 = xm and n = 0, the result for Y˜ is reduced to the standard case.
Let us consider a numeric example. We let α = 1.2, xm = 1, NX = NY = 10
7
and n = 104. In that case  = 316.5, F = 0.998 and x˜ = 1.78 and according to
equation (A.11) the share of wealth owned by the richest 10% is 0.76. The initial share
of wealth owned by the top 10% in Y was approximately 0.68. These results were
confirmed by a numerical simulation.
We note that the insights that can be deduced from this derivation are limited for
several reasons:
• The Pareto distribution is a good description of high levels of wealth but not of low
levels of wealth. Hence it cannot be simply applied for poor immigration waves.
• The analytic solution is limited to the same value of α and xm, and cannot
be used for modeling immigration between completely different economies. The
numeric example given may provide insight on the possible impact of the Moscowian
wealthiest elite hypothetical immigration to London, but not on the impact of the
immigration of Syrian middle class immigration to Germany.
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Appendix B. Derivation of ∆S for Pareto distribution in the poor
immigration scenario
According to equation (4), the change in the wealth share of the top 10% under the
poor immigration scenario follows
∆S ≈
∫ 0.9
0.9− ρ
10
x (FY ) dFY
µY
, (B.1)
where x (FY ) is the inverse function of the cumulative distribution function FY (x) and
µY is the average wealth in the population Y .
If Y follows a Pareto distribution with tail index α and scale parameter xm, the
inverse cumulative distribution function follows:
x (FY ) =
xm
(1− FY )
1
α
(B.2)
and the average is:
µY =
αxm
α− 1 . (B.3)
It follows that
∆S ≈
∫ 0.9
0.9− ρ
10
x (FY ) dF
µY
=
=
∫ 0.9
0.9− ρ
10
xm
(1−FY )
1
α
dFY
αxm
α−1
= (0.1 + 0.1ρ)1−
1
α − 0.11− 1α . (B.4)
Following the first order Taylor expansion of (0.1 + 0.1ρ)1−
1
α −0.11− 1α around ρ = 0
we obtain
∆S ≈
(
1− 1
α
)
0.11−
1
α · ρ , (B.5)
which is equation (5).
Appendix C. The analysis results for the Gini coefficient
The exact same procedure done for producing the results presented in figure 3 was
repeated this time calculating the change in the Gini coefficient of Y following the
different immigration scenarios. Considering GY as the Gini coefficient of Y and GY˜ as
the Gini coefficient of Y˜ we simply calculate and present their difference ∆G = GY˜ −GY .
We considered the same scenarios and parameters as done for figure 3. These results,
presented in figure C1 demonstrate that all the conclusions made for the share of wealth
owned by the top 10% are applicable for the Gini coefficient as well.
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Figure C1. The change in the Gini coefficient in population Y following the migration
from population X to population Y . The calculations were done for the two cases - low
inequality X (GX = 0.65) (left) and high inequality X (GX = 0.775) (right) for the 3
immigration scenarios - random (top), rich (middle) and poor (bottom). For each of
these cases the dependence of ∆G is on η - the ratio between the average wealth of X
and Y and on ρ - the fraction of the migrating population.
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